The fee should be scrapped
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The high-price tax will give us less clean power in both the short and long term. It is a textbook example of how a tax should not be launched.
Petter Bjerksund is a Professor of Finance and Management Science at NHH, the Norwegian School of Economics. He has a Master of Science degree (siviløkonom) from NHH and received his dr.oecon. degree at NHH in 1990.
His research interests include capital budgeting, investments, financial derivatives, risk management, real options, as well as financial aspects of energy and commodity markets. He has published in academic journals such as Journal of Fixed Income, Financial Management, Quantitative Finance, and Energy Journal. Bjerksund was Head of the Department of Finance and Management Science at NHH from 2002 to 2005.
Author(s) | Title | Publisher |
---|---|---|
Aase, Knut Kristian; Bjerksund, Petter | The Optimal Spending Rate versus the Expected Real Return of a Sovereign Wealth Fund | Journal of Risk and Financial Management Volume 14 (9) (35 pages); 2021 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Closed form spread option valuation | Quantitative finance (Print) Volume 14 (10); page 1785 - 1794; 2014 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Vagstad, Frank | Gas Storage Valuation: Price Modelling v. Optimization Methods | Energy Journal Volume 32 (1); page 203 - 227; 2011 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Rasmussen, Heine; Stensland, Gunnar | Valuation and Risk Management in the Norwegian Electricity Market | Energy Systems; page 167 - 185; 2010 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Myksvoll, Bjarte; Stensland, Gunnar | Exercising flexible load contracts: Two simple strategies | Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry Volume 24 (2); page 93 - 107; 2008 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Gjerde, Øystein | How to Extend the RiskMetrics™ Market Risk Universe | Finansparadigmet; page 145 - 156; 2002 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar; Brennan, Michael J.; Trigeorgis, Lenos | A Self-Enforced Dynamic Contract for Processing of Natural Resources | Project Flexibility, Agency, and Competition: New Developments in the Theory and Application of Real Options; page 109 - 127; 1999 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Schjelderup, Guttorm | The political economy of capital controls and tax policy in a small open economy | European Journal of Political Economy Volume 14 (3); page 543 - 559; 1998 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Utledning av rentens terminstruktur ved "maksimum glatthets"-prinsippet | Beta Volume 10 (1); page 2 - 6; 1996 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Implementing the Black-Derman-Toy Interest Rate Model | Journal of Fixed Income Volume 6 (2); page 67 - 75; 1996 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Ekern, Steinar | Contingent Claims Evaluation of Mean-Reverting Cash Flows in Shipping | Real Options in Capital Investment; page 207 - 219; 1995 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Schjelderup, Guttorm | Capital Controls and Capital Flight | FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis (FA) Volume 52 (2); page 33 - 42; 1995 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | An American Call on the Difference of two Assets | International Review of Economics and Finance Volume 3 (1); page 1 - 26; 1994 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | American Exchange Options and a Put-Call Transformation: A Note | Journal of Business Finance & Accounting Volume 20 (5); page 761 - 764; 1993 |
Bjerksund, Petter; Stensland, Gunnar | Closed Form Approximation of American Options | Scandinavian Journal of Management Volume 9; page S87 - S99; 1993 |
Main: Asset Management and Risk Analysis
Secondary: Business Taxation, Energy Markets, Resource Management and Sustainability
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The high-price tax will give us less clean power in both the short and long term. It is a textbook example of how a tax should not be launched.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The fixed price scheme has now got a loophole which makes it most profitable for the power producers to offer fixed price agreements to the customers who need it the least.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: The power producers' description of reality and arguments characterize the government's proposal for changes in power taxation. The proposal may have unintended effects that weaken competition and the power market itself.
By Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup has been published in Samfunnsøkonomen.
By Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup is published in International Tax and Public Finance.
By Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup has been published in Samfunnsøkonomen.
By Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup has been published in Samfunnsøkonomen.
By Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup is forthcoming in Samfunnsøkonomen.
Knut K. Aase and Petter Bjerksund: The optimal spending rate from the fund is significantly less than the fund’s expected real rate of return. The optimal spending rate ensures that the fund will last “forever”, but spending the expected return (following the fiscal rule, "handlingsregelen") will deplete the fund with probability one.
Petter Bjerksund and Guttorm Schjelderup: Research does not support the statement that wealth tax makes Norwegian investors less willing to own firms.
Petter Bjerksund: If the employee it to be treated like a founder, the new tax proposal for employee options should be supplemented.
Petter Bjerksund: Has the Labour Party thought that, once again, it should be profitable to convert earned income into capital income? Or does the party intend to increase the dividend tax by 2,3 percentage points?